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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Party References, Reference to the Appellate Record 
Mr. Platz concurs with the Idaho Transportation Department's description 
of the nature of the case, and intends to conform to the Department's system of 
references to the Appellate Record. The Idaho Department of Transportation will 
be referred to as "lTD." 
Factual Statement and Procedural History 
lTD mailed notice to Respondent C. Jack Platz on July 5,2011 that it 
intended to disqualify him from driving a commercial motor vehicle, as a result 
of his having "failed/ and or refused the evidentiary testing or have been 
convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating 
substances .... " Mr. Platz requested a hearing with a hearing examiner. Mr. 
Michael Howell was appointed by the ITD to hear the case. The case was heard 
by telephone on September 27, 201l. 
Prior to the hearing, counsel for Mr. Platz mailed evidence to the hearing 
officer that he wished to have considered in evidence. This is noted in Platz's 
Memorandum in Support of Petition, (R. at 61), Platz's Reply Brief (R. at 78), and 
in the transcript of the District Court (acting as an appellate court) hearing on the 
examiner's findings (Transcript of Appellate Hearing, 2/16/2012, at pp. 5-7). 
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The Hearing Examiner refused to consider the proffered evidence. Reply 
Brief (R. at 78). Based on the record that he had received from lTD, which 
included a notation that the ALS hearing officer had confirmed the suspension of 
Platz's license, the Hearing Examiner confirmed the disqualification of Platz's 
commercial drivers license, on September 30, 2011. 
Platz timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review and the disqualification 
was stayed. Platz and the ITD briefed the matter for the District Court. 
The District Court heard oral argument on February 16, 2012. The District 
Court vacated the Administrative License Suspension in Mr. Platz's case, and 
consequently set aside the disqualification of his CDL. (R. at 82-83.) 
lTD timely filed an appeal from the District Court decision. 
Issues on Appeal 
1. Whether Mr. Platz was afforded Due Process in the hearing procedure. 
2.a. Whether the the Hearing Examiner's decision was supported by sufficient 
and competent evidence. 
2.b. Whether the Hearing Examiner's decision demonstrated an abuse of 
discretion. 
3. Whether the District Court's vacating the disqualification was proper under 
Idaho law. 
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Standard of Review 
The controlling statute is as follows: 
(1) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to 
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. 
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by 
other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action 
unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or 
decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, 
and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, 
agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have 
been prejudiced. 
I.e. § 67-5279. 
On an appeal from the district court, the Idaho Supreme Court is to review 
the decision of the district court to determine whether it correctly decided the 
issues presented to it. Wright v. Bd. of Psychological Examiners, 148 Idaho 542, 
544-45, 2245 P.3d 1131, 1133-34 (2010). 
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ARGUMENT 
Mr. Platz was not afforded Due Process. 
The right to Due Process guaranteed by the Idaho and United States 
constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process be given 
meaningful notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard. Rudd v. Rudd, 105 
Idaho 112, 666 P.2d 639 (1983). Platz is not complaining of the notice afforded him 
in this case; he is complaining that his opportunity to be heard was in fact 
meaningless. 
"Because the suspension of issued driver's licenses involves state action 
that adjudicates important interests of the licensees, driver's licenses may not be 
taken away without procedural due process." Bell v. Idaho Transportation 
Department, 151 Idaho 659,664-65,262 P.3d 1030, 1035-36(Ct.App. 2011). The 
court must consider three factors in procedural due process challenges: the 
private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation through the process 
used (and the probable value of procedural safeguards), and the Government's 
interest including the function involved and the administrative burdens of 
additional procedural safeguards. Id., citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.s. 319, 
335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903(1976). 
The "private interest" factor is Mr. Platz's ability to make a living by 
driving a commercial vehicle. The government's interest is the safety of people 
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using the highway, and the governmental administrative burden of assuring due 
process in this case would be requiring the hearing officer to consider evidence. 
Presumably that already is the function of a hearing officer. 
The most troubling factor is the "risk of erroneous deprivation" -- in this 
case, the refusal to consider evidence resulting in the removal of any chance to 
rebut ITD's position. ("Erroneous deprivation" in this case is the exclusion of 
evidence.) While singular reliance on a prior hearing officer's finding avoids the 
problem of conflicting decisions on the same set of facts, the system employed by 
this hearing examiner results in a "hearing" in name only, because the examiner 
has not considered the case as a whole. No "process" is occurring except pro-
forma approval of another functionary's action -- a clerk at lTD had recorded that 
Mr. Platz failed an evidentiary test, presuming that it was a valid test. 
In general the State's position on Platz's Due Process issue is that Platz 
failed to make a record to complain from. (Appellant's Brief at 3-9.) But that is 
exactly Platz's own complaint -- he wanted to have a platform to argue from, and 
was denied that opportunity. 
lTD's statement, " ... when the Hearing Examiner is not offered an 
opportunity to consider evidence even if the Hearing Examiner indicates that 
such evidence may not be relevant, there is nothing for the Court's 
review," (Appellant's Brief at 6) is an inaccurate synopsis of the problem 
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presented to Platz. Platz made the evidence available, and the Hearing Examiner 
acknowledged as much. This is not just an argument for a different result as 
opposed to a different process, this is an appeal for a different result based on a 
different process. 
The hearings are allowed by rule to be relatively informal. IDAPA 
04.11.01.052, 04.11.01B.600. The hearings are conducted by telephone, with 
exhibits transmitted beforehand, with the officer making a record of what is 
available before him. The comparison to ALS hearings is unavoidable, since the 
sequence of events -- exhibits delivered beforehand, testimony by telephone 
(albeit while under oath), and then argument --is similar to that of an ALS 
hearing. The parties have a right to put on evidence and argue. IDAPA 
04.11.01.B157. The hearing is to be conducted in such a manner that a record 
should be easily made, in that such development should be assisted. IDAPA 
04.11.01B.600. 
While an examiner may have experience and some technical acumen in 
the field for which he is conducting a hearing, if the examiner does not even look 
at what is offered before he rejects it as irrelevant, that rejection flies in the face of 
the right to put evidence in a record, and IDAPA 04.11.01B.600. And yet that is 
exactly what happened: 
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Hearing Officer: Yeah, that's -- that what I received from the 
department. I also received from you a detailed history for police 
call and a copy of it looks like probably a DVD of the arrest. 
Mr. Johnson: Yes. 
Hearing Officer: Okay. 
Mr. Johnson: Well, yes. Have you had a chance to review those? 
Hearing Officer: I haven't, because they're not really relevant to 
these proceedings. You have an opportunity to have all that in the 
ALS hearing, and this hearing is not a review of the ALS and I will 
not revisit the facts surrounding the ALS. That's outside the scope 
of these proceedings.; You only get one bite at that apple. 
Transcript of the CDL Disqualification Hearing, September 27,2011, p. 2. 
(R. at 78.) 
Given that colloquy, Platz is hamstrung in his attempt to get evidence in 
front of the Hearing Examiner. When the Hearing Examiner declined to even 
consider the proffered evidence, Platz was denied even a ruling to appeal from, 
and the State made it an easy target: 
"The Hearing Examiner did not hear the due process 
complaints now made to the Court. Mr. Platz did not object to the 
hearing Procedure suggested by the hearing Examiner and simply 
now wants the Court to conclude that the procedures he 
knowingly participated in without object or offer of any evidence 
violates due process. The Court in Bell rejects his analysis, 
declining to resolve an issue on appeal, that was not raised for the 
Hearing Examiner, Bell @ 262 (Citing Viveros v. State Dept. of Health 
and Welfare, 126 Idaho 714, 889 P.2d 1104 (1995)). Such is the case 
here, Mr. Platz now argues to the Court something that was not 
presented to the Hearing Examiner." 
Brief of the Idaho Transportation Department (R. at 71.) 
But the colloquy made it clear that, although the protest regarding due 
process was not made at the time, clearly the evidence had been proffered and 
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ignored, without a ruling on the proffered evidence, without looking at the 
evidence. The Hearing Examiner had the evidence that he wanted to see, and he 
declined to review anything further that might direct him to another conclusion. 
This Court made clear in the decision in Wanner v. State, Department of 
Transportation, 150 Idaho 164, 244 P.3d 1250 (2011), the ALS system and the CDL 
disqualification processes are distinct and separate. When Mr. Wanner 
complained that the CDL consequences were not made clear to him at the time 
the I.e. §IS-S002 and S002A warning was read to him, the ALS consequence was 
of not affected because he was fully and fairly warned about the effect on his 
class D license. Mr. Wanner had filed for judicial review of his loss of CDL. This 
Court ruled that the failure to exhaust his administrative remedy prevented such 
potential relief. Wanner, 150 Idaho at 169, 244 P.3d at 1255. 
Second, the due process that is supposed to be afforded to a driver of a 
commercial vehicle is short-circuited when a CDL Hearing Examiner relies solely 
on the findings of an ALS Hearing Officer. In stark contrast to the Wanner 
decision, the Hearing Examiner in the case at bar pre-determined that the ALS 
process was the only arena in which he could present evidence: III will not revisit 
the facts surrounding the ALS. That's outside the scope of these proceedings.; 
You only get one bite at that apple." (R. at 7S.) 
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It is reasonable that evidence from the lTD be in front of the CDL Hearing 
Examiner prior to the hearing. However, the CDL Hearing Examiner in the case 
at bar made his ruling based on the actions of another functionary (an ITD 
employee) who has decided that the Driver has failed an evidentiary test. There 
had been a finding by a police officer, then a clerk at lTD has recorded that a test 
was failed, and an ALS hearing officer has found that based on the weight of the 
policeman's Probable Cause affidavit the ALS suspension will be sustained --
that conclusion has not been scrutinized by a truly impartial fact-finder. The 
police officer is not impartial-- he has made a decision in the field that he has a 
valid DUI arrest. It is unreasonable to believe that he will contradict his field 
decision by stating in his P / C affidavit that he erred. The clerk at ITD makes no 
decision at all, but the act of recording the policeman's affidavit is of grave 
consequence. Finally, ALS hearing officers are not inclined to find that a 
policeman erred in the substance of his apprehension and arrest of a DUI 
suspect. 
The truck drivers of Idaho have fallen into a Kafka-esque world where 
moment of accusation has devolved into an inextricable loss of privileges. They 
are entitled to an impartial review to have a realistic chance to challenge the 
findings. But once again, the "process" available to the CDL driver seeking relief 
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is not meaningful when it relies on the conclusions already within the ITD 
system. 
Finally, although this is listed as an issue on appeal, Mr. Platz notes that 
the District Court did not rule on the Due Process issue that was argued, but 
rather made its decision on the finding that the ALS ruling by the ITD Hearing 
Officer regarding the evidentiary test was vacated, thus the CDL disqualification 
would not stand. Should this court find that the evidentiary test was valid, Mr. 
Platz prays that this court find that his Due Process rights were ignored by the 
CDL Hearing Examiner, and sustain the District Court's vacation of the 
disqualification based on the trespass of those rights. 
2.a. Was the Hearing Examiner's decision supported by sufficient and competent 
evidence? 
It is incontrovertible that the hearing officer had evidence before him that 
showed that Platz had failed an evidentiary test. Unfortunately, this issue is 
inextricably woven into the prior issue, for two reasons listed above: first, express 
evidence countering the evidence before the Hearing Examiner was not 
considered despite being proffered, and second, the results of the evidentiary test 
itself were contested on appeal. Although the standard of "sufficient and 
competent" evidence has been met, it should be overwhelmed by the abuse of 
discretion displayed by the Hearing Examiner. If the Court were to ignore these 
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two problems with the Hearing Examiner's decision, it would amount to 
nullifying any appeal process which is afforded by statute. 
2.b. The Hearing Examiner's decision process demonstrated an abuse of 
discretion. 
The District Court acting in review of an agency's findings is limited to 
affirming that finding unless that finding was made: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
I.C §67-5279(3) 
The District Court can reverse an agency finding if that agency has abused 
its discretion in making its finding. I.C §67-5279(3)(e). The standard of abuse of 
discretion is described as, the factfinder must recognize the issue before him as 
one of discretion, the factfinder must act within the limits of discretion afforded 
him by law, and it much reach its decision by the exercise of reason. Kuhn v. 
Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 247, 245 P.3d 992, 999 (2010). 
It is likely that the Hearing Examiner did not recognize that the issue 
before him was one of discretion. Given his comments that he did want to 
review proffered evidence and that he had all of the State's documents before 
him, it appears that he had a pre-determined result. However, what is certain is 
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that he did not act within the bounds of his discretion when he did not review 
and rule on the evidence which was proffered. The bounds of the law he was 
violating is that of IDAPA 04.11.01B.600. Since he was conducting the hearing 
under the aegis of IDAPA, he is bound to make it easy for a participant to 
introduce evidence and make a record. That was completely ignored. 
"Applying reason" after refusing to consider evidence may be 
theoretically possible, but any conclusion drawn is worthless. The clearest abuse 
of discretion occurred with step two -- refusing to consider the evidence. 
lTD apparently argues that the Hearing Examiner only has to see a record 
of a failed evidentiary test in order to conclude that the CDL is disqualified, 
because the "substantial" evidence required is that it be more than a scintilla, 
less than a preponderance. (Appellant's Brief, p. 11, citing Masterson v. Idaho 
Dept. O/Transportation, 150 Idaho 126, 128,244 P.3d 625,627, (CLApp. 2010)). If 
that is the case, any mountain of evidence stacked up against it would fail, 
because the Hearing Examiner needs only something greater than a scintilla, 
(which of course is a subjective measure). A document supplied by the lTD 
showing a failure would be enough to convince a Hearing Examiner to believe 
that bit of evidence. 
The Hearing Examiner's abuse of discretion should nullify his Findings of 
Fact in this case, pursuant to I.C §67-5729(3). 
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3. The District Court's vacating the Disqualification was proper. 
The Hearing Examiner's Finding of Fact was based entirely on his 
conclusion that Platz failed the test leading to the Administrative License 
Suspension. When the District Court's ruled that the ALS was improperly 
determined, the basis for the CDL Disqualification was removed. This is the 
basis of the the District Court's vacating the Disqualification. (R. at 83.) 
lTD seems to accept this conclusion: "If the Administrative License 
Suspension is set aside by the reviewing Court, there there is no failed 
evidentiary testing for purposes of the disqualification pursuant to I.e. § 49-335." 
Appellant's Brief at 11. 
Without attempting to upset this apparent meeting of the minds, Platz 
maintains that given the current statutory scheme for ALS and CDL 
disqualification are on two tracks. This is consistent with this Court's ruling in 
Wanner. In the case at bar, the Hearing Examiner should be required to consider 
evidence, and his failure to do so would be sufficient to set this disqualification 
aside. 
Given the logistical and logical conundrum (the possibility of conflicting 
results) that presents for lTD, as acknowledged in oral argument in this case 
(Transcript of Appellate Argument, Feb. 16,2012, at pp. 19-20), the 
"mathematical" model discussed in oral argument assists in providing 
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consistent results for lTD. Given that the model is not a perfect model (the CDL 
disqualification ramifications are far greater than the ALS ramifications), hearing 
examiners should be compelled to observe IDAPA rules, the Idaho Code, and 
constitutional protections afforded to all citizens. While setting aside an ALS 
should be sufficient for setting aside a CDL disqualification, this Court should 
recognize that other factors justify setting aside a CDL disqualification. 
CONCLUSION 
The process afforded Mr. Platz was constitutionally deficient because he 
was not truly afforded an opportunity to put evidence before the Hearing 
Examiner, and in doing so the Hearing Examiner violated Platz's rights to Due 
Process. Furthermore, the refusal to consider the evidence amounted to an abuse 
of discretion which should lead this Court to set aside the Hearing Examiner's 
Findings of Fact. 
Last, the District Court made its decision to vacate the disqualification 
based on its ruling that the the ALS process itself nullified the test result. 
Notwithstanding that conclusion, should this Court decide differently on the 
ALS matter, the Disqualification should be set aside because of the statutory and 
constitutional violations of Mr. Platz's due process rights. 
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Mr. Platz prays that this Court sustain the decision of the District Court. 
Dated this of August, 2012. 
Ja~s E. Johnson 
atforney for Mr. Platz 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
mailed by first class U.s. Mail to 
Ed Li tteneker 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 321 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
on the --""-_ day of August, 2012 
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